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Abstract
This article proposes a framework for the analysis of experienced 
discrimination in home mortgages. It addresses the problem of home 
mortgage lending discrimination in one of the richest areas of northern Italy. 
Employees of a local hospital were interviewed to study their perception 
(or experience) of discriminatory behavior related to home financing. The 
analysis follows two steps. The first evaluates self-selection (the probability 
that individuals apply) and the second focuses on the likelihood that 
applications are accepted by the bank. Findings show that discrimination is 
likely to appear when the applicant’s nationality is considered. In addition to 
its findings, the study (a) provides an original econometric model on a two-
step procedure to test perceived discrimination and (b) suggests a method 
and approach that may constitute a point of reference for those willing to 
study perceived discrimination.
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Europe is undergoing a new wave of xenophobia and racism, as witnessed by 
the rise of radical right-wing political parties (Akkerman, 2005; Rydgren, 
2008; Taras, 2009). For example, the Italian Northern League (Lega Nord) 
“is widely criticised in Italy for being racist and xenophobic” (Bartlett, 
Birdwell, & Littler, 2011, p. 106; see also Randall, 2009; Semier, 2001) and 
“has incurred the ire of human rights organisations concerned about party 
leader Umberto Bossi’s suggestion that the Italian navy fire on all boats with 
illegal immigrants heading for the Italian coast” (Bartlett et al., 2011, p. 106). 
This party happened to sit in the Italian government 3 times in the last 20 
years and seems to build its strong support on the areas from where its leaders 
come (see Woods, 2009).
One of these areas—the one where the above-quoted party was born—is 
the environs of Varese, a city located in the Italian northwest, not far from the 
Swiss border. Are minorities living in areas that allegedly support xenopho-
bic and racist parties affected by unfair economic conditions? Are xenopho-
bia and racism reflected in the market?
In the winter of 2006-2007, employees of the Varese City Hospital (N = 
278) were asked to report their experiences with home mortgage loans. 
Contrary to most of the literature on discrimination in housing and the credit 
market (Pager & Shepherd, 2008, p. 188ff.), this study focuses on “per-
ceived” or “experienced” discrimination (Brüß, 2008; Pager & Shepherd, 
2008; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 2001) due to (a) the lack of official 
data (see below), and (b) the fact that this method has been vastly overlooked 
although it reveals very insightful aspects of discrimination (Kessler, 
Mickelson, & Williams, 1999). The study is exploratory in its nature as it 
appears to be one of the first on discrimination in the Italian home mortgage 
lending market. For this reason, findings from this study will help scholars, 
managers, and policy makers to better understand the problem of discrimina-
tion in this significant market sector.
This article follows the path of most empirical studies: Hypotheses are 
based on assumptions that, in turn, are based on theory. The theoretical 
framework is not linked to any ideology in that it reflects a positive approach 
to behavioral science. The article has four sections. The section “The Italian 
Credit Market at the Time of the Study” describes how the Italian mortgage 
market worked at the time of the study. The model used to analyze the data is 
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based on hypotheses presented in the section “Theoretical Framework and 
Hypotheses.” Methodology and results are given in the “Method” and 
“Results” sections. The discussion of findings is the final section.
The Italian Credit Market at the Time of the Study
Description of the Home Mortgage Process1
The procedure for mortgage approval starts with someone who applies for a 
loan (applicant) to buy, build, or renovate real estate property. While the bor-
rower often is already a client of the bank, it may not always be the case. 
After a preliminary verification of the “sustainability” of the mortgage 
(obtained by comparing income with the requested installments), the bank 
asks for an estimate of the value of the property by an independent registered 
real estate agent. Following this valuation, further verifications are made 
through a notary to find potential hidden problems (such as existing or previ-
ous mortgages, succession problems, and rights of way, etc.). In the case 
where no issues are found, a procedure for a line of credit is opened. The 
applicant must provide official documents regarding economic and social 
status (e.g., tax returns, payrolls, dependents), as well as information on pos-
sible loans by installments that he or she may have previously contracted. If 
he or she is a foreigner, the procedure requires some information concerning 
his or her length of stay in Italy. The whole procedure is simplified if the bor-
rower is already a client of the bank, as the checking account provides indis-
putable information concerning stability of earnings; otherwise, such 
information has to be obtained through official documents. Sometimes, the 
procedure is filled in before the estimate of the value of the property is 
obtained. Finally, the procedure provides an “internal rating measure.”2 
Measures are currently disclosed to the client, but they had not been disclosed 
to clients for a long time. It is worth noting that the percentage of banks with 
a credit scoring system has increased from 26% in 2003 to 51% in 2006 
(Rossi, 2008). This increase means that, at the time of data collection, the 
likelihood for a mortgage applicant to be evaluated on the basis of a credit 
score was particularly low.
The bank officer fills in the form, provides a synopsis, and sends it to the 
branch manager. If the value of the mortgage is below a certain threshold and 
risk is limited, the decision is taken directly by the manager. If one of the two 
conditions does not hold, then the application is sent to a central office of the 
bank that specializes in loan granting decisions. When forwarding the file, 
the local branch manager can mitigate negative elements or emphasize posi-
tive ones: This adjustment is generally aimed at correcting anomalies in the 
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rating software and seldom contributes to a bias in the procedure. The manag-
ing director may face criminal charges for potential misconduct. Nevertheless, 
adjustment leaves room for discretionary decisions.
When a mortgage holder faces bankruptcy, the initial lending is paid back 
through foreclosure of the property. This may not be enough to cover the 
value of the mortgage because of fluctuations in real estate markets and legal 
expenses, and so on. For this reason, the mortgage covers only a percentage 
(about 80%) of the minimum between the value of the property according to 
the contract and the value of the estimate; the ratio between the loan and the 
value of the property is called loan-to-value ratio.
There is a significant probability that even the choice of a low loan-to-
value ratio may not be able to guarantee break-even. To achieve this objec-
tive, banks can modify the interest rate, increasing the spread with the official 
discount rate. Up to few years ago, and surprisingly enough, Italian banks did 
not use this instrument a lot. After Basel II, spread variation has been increas-
ingly used. This increased use implies that, at the time of the study, the spread 
in the loan interest rate was only marginally used as an instrument to balance 
low creditworthiness, rejection being the main option available. More 
recently, some companies have entered the market with loan offers to clients 
traditionally neglected by banks. However, at the time of the study, applying 
to a traditional bank was, in all likelihood, the only alternative that a person 
interested in a loan could practice.
Applicant characteristics usually screened during the procedure are (a) 
age, as a proxy for creditworthiness; (b) job stability, again as a proxy for 
creditworthiness; (c) loan-to-value ratio; (d) net income, after adjustment for 
other loans and weighted on the number of family members; (e) nationality, 
length of residence in Italy, and length of residence in the current house or 
flat; (f) length of the requested loan period; and (g) collaterals (e.g., proper-
ties, in form of mortgages or pledges/pawns) and/or personal guarantees (bail 
bond).
There are also some other less objective factors considered as “informal” 
guarantees such as, for example, whether members of the applicant’s family 
have several checking accounts with the bank, or the length of the business 
relation between the client (or a client’s relative) and the bank.
Discretion in Mortgage Approval
The word “redlining” indicates discrimination of minorities in the home 
mortgage market (Graves, 2004, p. 132). The term was coined by human 
rights activists in Chicago, Illinois, in the late 1960s and originally desig-
nated the identification (through the drawing of a red line on a map) of urban 
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areas where the banks would not grant loans, thus de facto discriminating 
against people of similar ethnic background. It is not the objective of this 
article to review the history of redlining; nevertheless, it is important to 
acknowledge that today the word “redlining” indicates generic discrimina-
tion operated by banks toward a homogeneous group of individuals.
The U.S. Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in 
1974, but discrimination in bank lending practices remained alive as some 
studies pointed out (Peterson, 1981). In the early 1990s, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston (Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, & Tootell, 1992; Munnell, 
Tootell, Browne, & McEneaney, 1996) identified “some banks that . . . con-
tributed to urban decay by figuratively marking off areas on city maps in a 
process known as redlining” (Boatright, 1999, p. 99). Documents from the 
Federal Reserve showed that there were banks that rejected home mortgage 
loans on the basis of discrimination: That is, some of the rejections were not 
due to economic conditions of the applicants. The study of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston (Munnell, Tootell, Browne, & McEneaney, 1996) 
received criticism (Becker, 1993; Macey, 1994), but helped scholars, com-
munities, and bankers think of contemporary discrimination more seriously.
Several studies dealt with discriminatory issues in the banking industry 
(Becker, 1971; Block, Snow, & Stringham, 2008; Ferguson & Peters, 1995; 
Shaffer, 1996) and provided institutions and the scientific community with 
operative tools for isolating discrimination in banking practices. Most of the 
studies on discrimination in home mortgages focus on two basic issues: (a) 
gender (Peterson, 1981) and (b) race (Holmes & Horvitz, 1994; Holmes, 
Horvitz, & James, 1997; Tootell, 1996). The studies also lead to definitions 
of discrimination on the basis of (a) higher rejection rates and (b) higher 
interest rates for minority applicants (Boatright, 1999). A recent study on the 
closing costs for Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages finds 
evidence of such higher interest rates (Woodward, 2008).
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Peterson (1981) distinguishes between “economic discrimination” and “prej-
udicial” or “uneconomic” discrimination. The former “is based on relative 
credit risk and returns” and “is essential if a creditor wishes to avoid exces-
sive credit losses” (Peterson, 1981, p. 548). The latter “systematically causes 
the expected present value of loans made to members of one group to exceed 
the expected present value of equivalent loans made to other groups” 
(Peterson, 1981, p. 548).
Statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972) is the selection of 
categories/groups of people based on their characteristics and can be referred 
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to as “true stereotyping” (Schwab, 1986, p. 228). This stereotyping is some-
what similar to Peterson’s “economic” discrimination as it refers to informa-
tion about the perception of what the group average looks like. The problem 
is that the “mean” is then used to evaluate single cases. In the present work, 
the focus is on “uneconomic” discrimination that occurs when banks reject 
applications on a non-economic basis. This phenomenon occurs when two 
applicants’ same (or similar) economic conditions yield different results in 
terms of rejection, approval, or interest rate.
There is a distinction between (a) voluntary discrimination and (b) de 
facto or experienced discrimination. The former arises when the banker 
rejects or accepts mortgage requests with the precise willingness to adopt a 
different attitude toward different applicants. Voluntary discrimination can 
only be identified in studies conducted on the supply side; this identification 
requires that bankers are willing to tell if, how, and why they discriminated 
against somebody. This admission is a very unlikely occurrence, even if 
anonymous surveys are used. With no data from the supply side, splitting 
experienced and voluntary discrimination would be no more than a guess. To 
overcome this problem, research has focused on experimental audit data on 
paired tests of applicants (Massey & Lundy 2001; Turner & Ross, 2003a, 
2003b; Turner, Ross, Gaister, & Yinger, 2002).
Instead, experienced discrimination is paradoxically simpler to observe 
as it is a demand-side phenomenon resulting in the existence of different 
probabilities of mortgage acceptance for different individuals (possibly 
belonging to a well-defined social, ethnic, or cultural group) with the same 
creditworthiness. This observation does not require any voluntary discrimi-
natory effort on the part of the banker, either in the form of active discrimi-
nation (if the banker discriminates because of his or her own prejudices), 
nor in the form of passive discrimination (if the banker discriminates 
because of bank orders).
Moreover, experienced discrimination offers a safe way out of another 
subtler problem. The classic article by Schelling (1971) on spatial segrega-
tion contains a stimulating discussion on the “collectively enforced” macro-
phenomena that can arise from several forms of “organized” or “economically 
induced” discrimination. Schelling argues that it is difficult to disentangle 
these forms of discrimination because of the interactions between individuals 
in the population. This consideration supports the choice of making explicit 
reference to a demand-side phenomenon that is observed on an individual 
basis such as experienced discrimination. Indeed, whether discrimination is 
voluntary or involuntary, active or passive, the most relevant type for appli-
cants is experienced discrimination, as it may reveal aspects that affect human 
personality (if related to negative affectivity, for example; Digman, 1990), 
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and it has been shown to relate to health conditions, especially in elderly 
people (Barnes et al., 2008).
As far as this study is concerned, official data on the home mortgage lend-
ing market were unavailable at the time when data were collected. Financial 
institutions, the Italian Association of Banks (ABI), and supervising bodies 
(including Banca d’Italia [Bank of Italy], the Italian central bank) provide 
scarce data on loan applications, rejections, interest rates, and so forth. As no 
other alternative is available, the study is limited to measurable and observ-
able characteristics of the applicant. Therefore, the focus is on de facto or 
experienced discrimination. On one hand, experienced discrimination is pre-
cisely the kind of phenomenon in which borrowers are interested as it implies 
that the probability of receiving mortgages depends on their creditworthiness 
and on other non-economic variables. On the other hand, this phenomenon is 
simpler to analyze if data on mortgage acceptance and rejection is collected 
using the applicant as the sampling unit. Although the banker’s individual 
beliefs are important information, the article addresses only the final outcome 
of the process (acceptance or rejection) as a function of the characteristics of 
the applicant. To take into consideration the varying degree of creditworthi-
ness, an empirical study should record data on (a) level of income, (b) job, 
and (c) expected life span of the individual.3 In a world without discrimina-
tion, the probability of mortgage acceptance would not depend on variables 
other than creditworthiness. As a test for the presence of discrimination is the 
objective of the article, the above-mentioned economic factors become con-
trol variables.
Prejudices and biases affect society and banks are no exception. Put differ-
ently, if prejudices and biases have a given distribution in a population (the 
society), there is a legitimate expectation to find them distributed similarly in 
a sample extracted from that population (e.g., the banking industry). There is 
no evidence to support the hypothesis that discrimination within the banking 
industry occurs for reasons other than those of the remainder of society. 
Therefore, discrimination against applicants may appear because of gender, 
nationality, and other “standard” discriminatory variables (Rodriguez, 2008).4 
However, individual behavior is socio-culturally biased and the intensity of 
discrimination with respect to a variable may depend on the general socio-
cultural conditions of a specific area. For example, in a recent study, Brüß 
(2008) compares perceived discrimination of Turkish, Moroccan, and 
Bangladeshi Muslims in three European cities and finds that discrimination 
varies depending on which ethnic group is considered.
The study is retrospective with data collected on an individual basis by 
interviewing hospital employees and asking whether they applied for mort-
gage requests and, in the cases where they did, whether their requests were 
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accepted. The statistical analysis is divided into two steps as well as all the 
hypotheses. The first step is the evaluation of the probability of requesting 
a loan as a function of the characteristics of the individual. First, this 
accounts for the so-called “self-selection” – i.e. the fact that people do not 
ask for loans because they think they will not get them – thus anticipating 
the refusal (Longhofer & Peters, 2005). This self-selection is not overt dis-
crimination, but is a particularly serious and perverse consequence of dis-
crimination. Second, there is a need to acknowledge that somebody may 
decide to stay out of the market for reasons other than this by-product of 
discrimination. In particular, the expectation is that some categories have a 
lower probability of applying for mortgages because of alternative financ-
ing sources. For example, women may choose not to ask for loans because 
their husbands (or partners) do, and Muslims may too because religious 
interdictions compel them to apply to Islam banking institutions (Belkaïd, 
2008; Warde, 2000). The second step analyzes rejection rates, once home 
loans are requested, as functions of both creditworthiness and membership 
to potentially discriminated groups. Hypotheses reflect this two-step ana-
lytical process.
The study does not have a particular orientation as far as theory is con-
cerned; however, the assumption is that simple market mechanisms (Block 
et al., 2008) fail to provide a viable explanation to the issue of discrimination 
(see Secchi, 2011).
In summary, the analysis of the two steps is based on six variables: gender, 
nation, family dimension, age, personal income, and profession. Income, pro-
fession, and age are the control variables. Variables are defined on the basis 
of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Gender
Italy records one of the lowest scores on equal opportunities issues among 
European countries (European Commission, 2008). Although the role of 
women in society is slightly changing, this cultural process seems to be par-
ticularly slow. Traditionally, men tend to be the economic and financial home 
managers, even in cases where their wives earn more.
All other economic variables being equal, women do not apply for home 
mortgages and, when they do, they find it harder to get approval.
Hypothesis 1.1 (H1.1): Home mortgage requests are less frequent for 
women than for men.
Hypothesis 1.2 (H1.2): The rejection rate is likely to be higher for women 
than for men.
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Nationality
Ethnicity is another factor of discrimination (Munnell et al., 1996). The word 
“race” is voluntarily avoided as it has no biological meaning when referred to 
human beings (Graves, 2004); it has a social meaning which is not supported 
in this article (Formoso, 2001; Gallissot, Kilani, & Rivera, 2001). The term 
nation offers a safe alternative as it refers to differences in ethnicity, habits, 
language, and other related variables. This term fits particularly well with the 
Italian case where “state” is not the same as “nation.” The latter point deserves 
some explanation. Italy is a puzzle, both in economic and cultural/social 
terms (Putnam, 1994). Many nations are represented under the same state 
flag: For example, Sicilians speak a different Italian language from Lombards, 
and have different social habits, ethics, and culture. These differences are 
comparable with the ones observed in France or in Spain, but Italy reached 
unity as one state only about 150 years ago and this circumstance reflects citi-
zens’ feelings of belongingness to different “national” sub-areas of the coun-
try. In the past (especially during the 1960s and the 1970s), many southern 
Italians faced brutal discrimination when they went north to find jobs 
(Gallissot et al., 2001, pp. 203-204; Ginsborg, 1989, p. 293ff.; Merrill, 2006, 
p. 98ff.). They were described as lazy, and allegations that they are short of 
intellectual capabilities have been reiterated recently from the newspaper La 
Padania (Oneto, 1998; Riboni, 1998; Stagnaro, 1999), which is financed by 
Lega Nord (Northern League), a political party of the extreme right (Randall, 
2009; Semier, 2001). This “xenophobic” party— as the international press 
(“Sing a Song of Xenophobia,” 2006; “Rome v Roma,” 2008) defines it—has 
its origins in northern Italy and was very popular in the area where data were 
collected. Racism and xenophobia appear to be widespread so that Italians 
moving from south to north are sometimes treated as “foreigners” (Oneto, 
1998). Hence, if the study analyzes discrimination in northern Italy, then 
there is a need to understand that it might be based on these subtle distinc-
tions that are part of Italian history that may be difficult to understand for 
foreign observers.
Therefore, the variable nationality indicates a wide variety of conditions 
in this study: (a) people coming from a foreign country irrespective of inside 
or outside the European Union (EU) and (b) Italians coming from different 
areas of the country, typically the economically underdeveloped south. 
Because of low wages and high cost of living in the region of Varese, it was 
expected that most of the foreigners interviewed come from poor countries. 
The large majority of Italian households (about 75%) own their house (Istat, 
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 2007c). From the second generation on, local 
people own one (or more) home(s) as opposed to immigrants (southerners 
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and foreigners) who need to buy one. The decision was to test whether for-
eigners and Italian-foreigners (from elsewhere in Italy) receive different 
treatments. There is an expectation that foreigners face tougher conditions 
than Italians, and that the same scheme can be applied for southern versus 
northern Italians.
Hypothesis 2.1 (H2.1): Home mortgage requests are more frequent for 
southern than for northern Italians.
Hypothesis 2.2 (H2.2): The rejection rate is likely to be higher for south-
ern than for northern Italians.
In the last 10 to 15 years, Italy has faced an unexpected flow of immigrants. 
The National Institute of Statistics (Istat) estimates the increase of legal immi-
grants (called “foreigners” in the Istat report) at a dramatic 342% in the decade 
1996-2006, from 0.8 million to 2.77 million (Istat, Istituto Nazionale di 
Statistica, 2007a). That number almost doubled in 2010: A report from Caritas-
Migrantes (2010), respectively a Catholic nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) and a foundation, estimates that there are now five million immigrants. 
Emotional responses and prejudicial positions, also on part of the local author-
ities, have increased altogether with this population increase (Woods, 2009). 
International authorities called on the Italian government to stop discrimina-
tion and racism against minorities (European Commission Against Racism 
and Intolerance, 2008), with very limited or no response at all. On a smaller 
scale, several local administrations, especially when supported by the Lega 
Nord (Northern League), have appealed to the population to refrain from rent-
ing houses to immigrants, often passing special ordinances to enforce the 
request (Del Frate, 2009). Whether Italian banks fall in line with these govern-
mental practices is unknown, but it is interesting to check if a similar evidence 
can be found. Foreigners often come from poor countries and are in extreme 
need of money and work. It is likely they would ask for home mortgages, at 
least those who decided to live in Italy.
Hypothesis 2.3 (H2.3): Home mortgage requests are more frequent for 
foreigners than for Italians.
Hypothesis 2.4 (H2.4): The rejection rate is likely to be higher for for-
eigners than for Italians.
Family Dimension
Italian fertility rate—number of children per woman—was 1.29 between 
2000 and 2005, and the population is projected to decrease by 7.2% in the 
 by guest on March 24, 2015bas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Secchi and Seri 11
next 40 years (Istat, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 2007b; UN Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2007, pp. 56,75).
In the Italian case, large families have more than three members. Given this 
scenario, these exceptionally large families are not interested in mortgage appli-
cations as they probably already applied for them when their families were 
smaller. However, when large families submit their applications for the loans, the 
likelihood of rejection is higher because (a) the income each partner needs to 
sustain the family is higher compared with small families, and (b) they are per-
ceived as social “deviations” from the standard small family. When both mem-
bers of the small family work—which is the most likely scenario—it seems likely 
that their applications get accepted. The following hypotheses are developed:
Hypothesis 3.1 (H3.1): Home mortgage requests are more frequent for 
smaller than for larger families.
Hypothesis 3.2 (H3.2): The rejection rate is likely to be higher for larger 
than for smaller families.
Method
The studies mentioned in the previous sections analyze the U.S. mortgage 
market where transparency is the rule and researchers are granted access to 
official data on rejections and interest rates. The Italian Central Bank pub-
lishes monthly and yearly studies on the state-of-the-art of mortgage lending 
in the country (Banca d’Italia, 2006). Therefore, there is evidence that, for 
example, the same commercial bank applies different rates depending on the 
residency of the applicant (north or south Italy). However, access to public 
data on mortgage rejection rates is limited due to the lack of modernization of 
the banking system (McCann, 2007). Without law enforcement, banks are 
reluctant to provide data, so it was impossible to get official data. Informal 
statements were collected from middle managers of Italian banks who stated 
that they do use creditworthiness criteria and expected default risk rates per 
each customer category, but access to the actual rejection rates was denied. 
The Italian Association of Banks (ABI) is no different and provides no infor-
mation on this topic. Also, recent articles on the Italian mortgage market 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti & Felici, 2008; Felici, Manzoli, & Pico, 2012; Rossi, 
2008) have limited their analysis to accepted mortgage requests.
For these reasons, as a preliminary and exploratory analysis on discrimi-
nation in the Italian home mortgage lending market, the study focuses on the 
individual experience of discriminatory practices. No study on this specific 
topic has been found; thus, this work takes the nature of a pilot study and 
serves to define the worthiness of the issue for the Italian banking industry.
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The study was conducted in Varese, Lombardy, one of the richest areas of 
the country and of the European continent.5 Immigration from poorer and 
extra-European countries is higher here (Caritas-Migrantes, 2005, 2010) as 
compared with the rest of Italy, and discrimination seems to be “institutional-
ized.” In fact,
although the Consolidated Text on Immigration provides the right of foreign 
citizens to have access to low-rent public housing (ERP) under the same 
conditions as Italian citizens, . . . the regulations of the Lombardy Region 
which require at least five years residence for a person to qualify for public 
housing are still in use despite the fact that they have been declared 
discriminatory and unconstitutional by the Regional Administrative Court 
(TAR) of Lombardy. (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2008, 
p. 58)
These housing solutions are available only to extremely poor individuals, 
hence this case is not related to the mortgage market but it may be read as a 
symptom of a diffused attitude toward diversity.
The Sample
The study focuses on a single large organization to make the analysis easier 
and to take into account a wide range of salaries, professions, and all the 
above-mentioned variables. The City Hospital of Varese is an organization 
large enough and presents a wide set of variables and conditions that can be 
tested against the hypotheses. It has four main locations with 3,995 employ-
ees (2001), 1,467 beds, and 59,240 clients (see Table 1).
The choice of a hospital for the analysis is consistent with two key ele-
ments. First, the goal is to analyze if there is discrimination in the selected 
area. The analysis presented in this study is valuable if—checking for per-
sonal income, social roles and status, gender, nationality, and professions—
somebody has experienced some form of discrimination. The hospital (see 
Table 1) fits this criterion very well. If discrimination is found, then further 
analyses on a broader level are needed. Being the first of its kind, the present 
study is a preliminary analysis of perceived discrimination in Italy. Second, 
approval from the hospital’s Human Resources (HR) Department brought 
two important results: (a) a very low non-response rate (4%) and (b) a ran-
dom sample of the hospital’s employees. These two facts (and especially 
point [a]) have significant statistical impacts. The choice of an organization 
with this variety of factors—or sampling frame, such as income, gender, eth-
nicity, and age, and so on—seems consistent with the scope of the analysis 
(Groves et al., 2009, p. 70ff.).
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Interviews took place in the recreational/dining area and in the parking lot 
to minimize interference with employees’ working procedures. According to 
the HR Department, differences in shifts among employees gave good prob-
ability of randomizing the sample. To avoid interviewer bias (Groves et al., 
2009), 290 interviews were collected in three different times and locations. 
Participant anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed throughout the 
entire process. After the usual data adjusting and polishing (Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003), the final sample is N = 278. Data were collected dur-
ing the winter of 2006-2007.
Table 1 shows discrepancies between official employee data and the 
selected sample. These differences are due to the fact that the participants 
were employees of the administrative headquarters, where there are higher 
numbers of middle managers and other administrators. The only number that 
seems to be affected is that of nurses and lab technicians (which appear below 
the level of the population percentage in the sample). Beside this discrepancy, 
the sample is a consistent representation of the hospital’s population.
Measures
The set of questions used in the interview is divided in two sections. The first 
collects general biographical data, whereas the second is dedicated to mort-
gage-related discriminatory issues. Sample questions include items such as 
“Have you ever asked for a home mortgage loan?” “Have you ever been 
denied a home mortgage loan?” or “Do you have the perception that the loan 
has been rejected on the basis of your area/region/country of origin?” The last 
question above was included as a check on illegitimate questions (on prejudi-
cial or non-economic issues) that the banker might have asked when discuss-
ing the application, but was not used as a control variable in the estimation of 
Table 1. Sample Distribution (%, Professions).
Professions Sample % Hospitala %
Doctors 43 15.47 633 15.84
Top managers 9 3.24 20 0.50
Other employees 55 19.78 1,005 25.16
Middle management, security, 
and other laborers
84 30.22 741 18.55
Nurses and lab technicians 87 31.29 1,596 39.95
Grand total 278 100 3,995 100
aThese are cumulative data that include workers of the five hospitals of the system. Data 
retrieved online (http://www.ospedalivarese.net/index.php?url=hazosp_dati_per).
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the model. All information gathered is self-reported data, meaning that par-
ticipants describe themselves to the interviewer. Nationality means the place 
of birth or culture of reference.
As in every research based on survey data, there is the risk that partici-
pants provide dishonest answers (Clark & Desharnais, 1998). This phenom-
enon increases its likelihood when people are asked about sensitive issues 
and when there is a mismatch in characteristics of interviewers and inter-
viewees (Christensen & Rosenthal, 1982; Flores-Macias & Lawson, 2008; 
Fuchs, 2009). Interview questions were designed to reduce potential discom-
fort of participants. The topic “discrimination” does not appear among sensi-
tive issues in the literature on interviewer’s gender effect (Fuchs, 2009). 
However, the team of interviewers was sufficiently diverse in terms of gender 
and other personal characteristics. Overall, there is no reason to believe that 
dishonest were more probable than honest answers. Acronyms, definitions, 
and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2, while Table 3 shows cor-
relation coefficients.
About 54% of interviewees (149 out of 278) applied for mortgages and 
only 11% (16 out of 149) were rejected, so at a first glance it seems very hard 
not to get financed for a home mortgage in the study area (Table 3). It is 
important, however, to study the determinants of both the application process 
and its acceptability to potential customers. Ideally, there should be no dis-
crimination on non-economic criteria in mortgage lending, which should 
directly reflect sound creditworthiness standards only. A high rejection rate 
strongly correlated with applicant non-economic characteristics would be 
solid evidence of explicit redlining, but in the absence of explicit redlining 
discrimination is unlikely to occur in readily detectable ways. Discrimination 
may be instead a subtle and socially embedded phenomenon.
Data are analyzed with a model that is called sequential logit (Gouriéroux, 
2000, Section 3.4.1) and is used to study two sequential decisions such that, 
as in the present situation, the second decision is faced only when the first 
one has a positive result (see the mathematical appendix for details). 
Estimation has been performed using maximum likelihood estimation in R 
(R Development Core Team, 2008). The variance of the parameters is com-
puted using the observed Hessian. The estimated variances are checked com-
paring confidence intervals (CIs) using these variances with other ones based 
on the likelihood ratio principle (Meeker & Escobar, 1995) that yielded 
almost the same results. As an alternative to the classical maximum likeli-
hood estimator, the same logistic model was estimated using Firth’s (1993) 
penalized maximum likelihood estimators, which is known to remove first-
order bias and correct for other problems arising in small samples (Heinze, 
2006). Results were virtually unchanged so that we only provide classical 
maximum likelihood estimates.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample.
Variable Description M SD
Y1 Request of mortgage 0.536 0.499
Y2 Acceptance of mortgage request 0.478 0.500
FEM Dummy variable: 1 if female 0.522 0.500
AGE1834 Dummy variable: 1 if age is between 18 
and 34
0.263 0.440
AGE3550 Dummy variable: 1 if age is between 35 
and 50
0.550 0.497
AGE51+ Dummy variable: 1 if age is 51 or more 0.187 0.390
NITA Dummy variable: 1 if from Northern Italy 0.640 0.480
SITA Dummy variable: 1 if from Central or 
Southern Italy
0.291 0.454
ABR Dummy variable: 1 if from abroad 0.069 0.253
FAM1 Dummy variable: 1 if family composed of 
1 person
0.112 0.315
FAM2 Dummy variable: 1 if family composed of 
2 people
0.187 0.390
FAM3 Dummy variable: 1 if family composed of 
3 people
0.291 0.454
FAM4 Dummy variable: 1 if family composed of 
4 people
0.335 0.472
FAM5 Dummy variable: 1 if family composed of 
5 people or more
0.075 0.263
INC0015 Dummy variable: 1 if income between 0 
and 15,000 €
0.259 0.438
INC1530 Dummy variable: 1 if income between 
15,000 and 30,000 €
0.446 0.497
INC3050 Dummy variable: 1 if income between 
30,000 and 50,000 €
0.176 0.381
INC50+ Dummy variable: 1 if income of 50,000 € 
or more
0.119 0.324
DOC Dummy variable: 1 if doctor 0.155 0.362
MAN Dummy variable: 1 if manager 0.032 0.176
EMP Dummy variable: 1 if employee 0.198 0.398
SEC Dummy variable: 1 if security or laborer 0.302 0.459
TEC Dummy variable: 1 if laboratory technician 
or nurse
0.313 0.464
NTJ Dummy variable: 1 if non-tenure job 0.194 0.395
Note. The mean and the standard deviation are computed over 278 observations. NTJ = non-
tenure job.
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Results
The two models presented below are quite parsimonious in terms of param-
eters. For this reason, the study includes some marginally significant vari-
ables that may have an interest in terms of interpretation, consistently with 
Gigerenzer (2004) and Davidson (2000, Section 7.5.2).
Determinants of Mortgage Application
The starting point is the analysis of the determinants of mortgage application, 
variable Y i1, . The section follows a general-to-specific formulation: From the 
complete model (Model 1) in which the vector xi  contains all the variables 
(apart from AGE51+, ABR, FAM5, INC50+, TEC, as they would raise a col-
linearity problem) a parsimonious model (Model 2) is obtained through pro-
gressive elimination of the variables. This emphasis on the variable selection 
procedure is not superfluous as, as shown below, special attention to variable 
selection is needed to analyze determinants of mortgage acceptance.6
Table 4 provides results of the estimation procedure. The likelihood ratio 
test for the restriction from Model 1 to Model 2 takes the value 3.5587 with 
14 degrees of freedom and a p value equal to .9986, strongly failing to reject 
the restriction. The study also considers a test for the restriction from Model 
2 to a model without regressors (Model 3). The likelihood ratio test of this 
restriction yields a value of 12.61882 with 3 degrees of freedom and a p value 
equal to .0055. Therefore, this restriction is rejected. In an attempt to improve 
explanatory power, other models were introduced including subsets of the 
regressors, but Model 2 seems to be the best one. In the following, hypothe-
ses acceptance and rejection are discussed as they relate to Model 2 only.
The restricted model (Model 2) discards variables related to gender and 
family size. Data do not support the fact that women request mortgage loans 
less frequently than men (H1.1), nor that the probability to apply is higher for 
smaller than for larger families (H3.1).
Table 4 also shows that variable non-tenure job (NTJ) has a negative and 
strongly significant effect, supporting the idea that employees with NTJs 
have a lower probability of applying for mortgages. Although this circum-
stance has not been taken into consideration during the hypotheses-building 
phase, the analysis provides evidence that NTJ is positively correlated to 
FEM (females), AGE1834 (individuals of age 18-34), NITA (northern 
Italians), and DOC (doctors), while it is negatively correlated with AGE3550 
(individuals of age 35-50), SITA (southern Italians), and EMP (generic 
employees). NTJ is a control variable as it discounts effects related to other 
variables; this variable is related to creditworthiness, hence, its statistical 
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significance cannot be associated with discrimination. It is highly correlated 
to variables related to residency, age, and gender, but not to family size. 
Therefore, it can be argued that discrimination customarily attributed in 
casual speaking to age and gender is indeed related, at least in the case of 
hospital employees, to NTJs. It comes as no surprise that Model 2 includes 
this variable.
Variables NITA and SITA have positive and strongly significant impacts 
on the probability of applying for a mortgage; for the hypothesis that the 
impact of NITA and SITA is the same, the likelihood ratio test takes the value 
1.9322 with 1 degree of freedom and a p value of .1645. This suggests that, 
while foreigners (ABR) have a much lower probability of applying for mort-
gages, there is no difference between northern and southern Italians. 
Therefore, both H2.1 and H2.3 are rejected. However, it is difficult to inter-
pret unambiguously the statistical significance of these variables as a sign of 
self-selection due to mortgage refusal. As an example, Muslims may not ask 
for mortgages from classical Western banks because of religious interdic-
tions. Moreover, in Model 2 there is no effect of variables related to family 
size, hence H3.1 cannot be accepted as formulated.
Table 5 presents the probabilities of mortgage application as a function of 
the statistically significant characteristics of the individuals. Along with these 
probabilities, Table 5 also provides the standard deviation of the probability 
(based on the variance of the estimators) and the lower and the upper bounds 
of a 95% CI computed using the logit transform of the probabilities (so to 
avoid nonsensical values outside the interval [0,1]). Table 6 shows a measure 
of the variation of the probability when a regressor varies and the other ones 
stay constant. The effects of the significant variables are quite strong in 
Table 5. Mortgage Application Rate.
Variables Probability SD Lower bound Upper bound
Non-tenured, 
foreigner
17.952989% 8.627393% 6.491732% 40.816629%
Non-tenured, 
southern Italian
50.146838% 8.915838% 33.333622% 66.926912%
Non-tenured, 
northern Italian
40.66770% 6.93122% 28.07507% 54.61933%
Tenured, foreigner 28.56334% 10.73023% 12.48379% 52.84740%
Tenured, southern 
Italian
64.764932% 5.362688% 53.696314% 74.446797
Tenured, northern 
Italian
55.604578% 4.105671% 47.480855% 63.439299%
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practice: For people with tenure, the probabilities of applying for mortgages 
are, respectively, 55.60%, 64.76%, and 28.56% for northern Italians, south-
ern Italians, and foreigners; for non-tenured people, the same probabilities 
are 40.67%, 50.15%, and 17.95%.
Determinants of Mortgage Acceptance
This section is dedicated to the analysis of variable Y i2, , mortgage accep-
tance. In this case, there is a problem related to there being only 16 partici-
pants out of 149 with rejected applications. This low count is a serious limit 
to the number of regressors that can be introduced in the model to be reduced. 
All the procedures implemented to obtain a manageable result seem to con-
verge at the same final model (Model 1, Table 7). The first procedure was to 
follow a specific-to-general procedure where variables were added so to 
obtain a well-balanced model (this path is similar to Drzewiecki & Andersen, 
1982, pp. 2415-2416). This procedure is the opposite of the one followed in 
the first step, and depends on the fact that the observations available to test 
the hypotheses in the second step are highly unbalanced between acceptance 
Table 6. Differences in Mortgage Application Rate.
Variable Fixed variables Difference SD
Between tenured and 
non-tenured
For foreigner 10.610356% 5.733076%
Between tenured and 
non-tenured
For northern Italian 14.936879% 7.601249%
Between tenured and 
non-tenured
For southern Italian 14.618094% 7.760207%
Between northern 
Italian and foreigner
For non-tenured 22.71471% 8.76637%
Between northern 
Italian and foreigner
For tenured 27.04123% 11.33436%
Between southern 
Italian and foreigner
For non-tenured 32.19385% 10.06825%
Between southern 
Italian and foreigner
For tenured 36.20159% 11.91312%
Between northern and 
southern Italian
For non-tenured −9.479139% 6.894677%
Between northern and 
southern Italian
For tenured −9.160354% 6.507618%
Note. The column “Variable” shows the varied regressor.
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and refusal. The second procedure used an automatic backward elimination 
algorithm to test the validity of variables included in the final model. Table 7 
shows results of the estimation.
The likelihood ratio test for the restriction of Model 1 to a model contain-
ing only the intercept as a regressor (Model 2) yields 14.0346 with 3 degrees 
of freedom and a p value equal to .0029, thus leading to rejection of the sim-
pler model.
The variable AGE3550 has a positive and marginally significant impact: 
The probability of mortgage acceptance is lower for younger and older indi-
viduals. This result can be linked to creditworthiness, as younger individuals 
have usually wages too low to guarantee a mortgage, whereas older individu-
als have lower creditworthiness because of their shorter expected life spans. 
None of the variables related to gender or family size are significant in the 
model, hence all related hypotheses (H1.2, H3.2) have to be rejected. 
However, it is apparent that AGE3550 has a positive correlation with FAM3 
Table 7. Regression Model for Y2.
Variable
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient SE t stat p value Coefficient SE t stat p value
Constant −0.59054 0.93569 −0.63113 .52795 2.11758 0.26459 8.00319 0***
FEM  
AGE1834  
AGE3550 0.89479 0.58023 1.54213 .12304  
NITA 2.99742 1.04336 2.87284 .0041***  

















*p value between .05 and .1. **p value between .01 and .05. ***p value between 0 and .01.
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and FAM4 and a negative correlation with FAM1, FAM2, and FAM5 (see 
Table 3). This fact suggests that the study should have focused on families 
with or without children rather than small and large families. This distinction 
would probably have carried more support for H3.2.
The other variables in Model 2 relate to the nationality of the participants: 
They are both positive and strongly significant. It is interesting in this case to 
check whether the impact of NITA and SITA is the same: The likelihood ratio 
test has the value 4.2069 with 1 degree of freedom and a p value of .0403. 
Therefore, northern Italians seem to have a higher probability of acceptance 
than southern Italians, and Italians in general have a higher probability than 
foreigners. Both H2.2 and H2.4 are therefore accepted.
Tables 8 and 9 show mortgage acceptance rates and they should be read 
similarly to those in Tables 5 and 6. For a customer aged between 35 and 50, 
the probability of receiving an acceptance is 96.45%, 88.89%, and 57.55%, 
respectively, for northern Italians, southern Italians, and foreigners. For cus-
tomers of different age groups, the same probabilities drop to 91.73%, 
76.59%, and 35.65%.
Implications
When related to nationality issues, all hypotheses tested in the second step—
that is, H2.2 and H2.4 with respect to rejection—are accepted, whereas all 
hypotheses in the first step—that is, H2.1 and H2.3 with respect to home 
mortgage requests—are rejected.
Table 8. Mortgage Acceptance Rate.







57.54798 25.27799 15.13867 91.15134
Middle-aged, 
southern Italian
88.894336 4.865917 75.286246 95.461164
Middle-aged, 
northern Italian
96.448577 1.961745 89.835925 98.815809
Non-middle-aged, 
foreigner
35.651031 21.465639 8.132437 77.615557
Non-middle-aged, 
southern Italian
76.588250 8.603654 56.088137 89.337338
Non-middle-aged, 
northern Italian
91.734998 3.955211 79.969844 96.860892
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The two-step model suggests that all hypotheses related to gender (H1.1 
and H1.2) and family discrimination (H3.1 and H3.2) are rejected. The fol-
lowing pages are dedicated to the discussion of findings for each of the vari-
ables on which hypotheses have been based. General discussion and 
conclusion follow.
Nationality
Differences between northern and southern Italy continue to feed people’s 
prejudices. Southern Italians speak with an accent and phrasing that sound 
completely different from those spoken in the northern part of the country. At 
the time of the study, the traditional process of in-person applications was 
accepted. Therefore, it was easy for a banker to recognize where the person 
sitting in front of him or her came from. This recognition ease may explain 
the disparities in rejection rates.
The most interesting result that can be found in the data stresses how for-
eigners receive differential treatment when applying for home mortgages. 
Most of the foreigners in the sample described themselves as Muslims. H2.2 
and H2.4 may be related to the phenomenon of discrimination against 
Table 9. Differences in Mortgage Acceptance Rate.
Variable Fixed variables Difference (%) SD (%)
Between non-middle-
aged and middle-aged
For foreigner 21.89695 14.06147
Between non-middle-
aged and middle-aged
For northern Italian 4.713579 3.556606
Between non-middle-
aged and middle-aged
For southern Italian 12.306086 8.575291
Between northern 
Italian and foreigner
For middle-aged 38.90059 24.83714
Between northern 
Italian and foreigner
For non-middle-aged 56.08397 21.59048
Between southern 
Italian and foreigner
For middle-aged 31.34635 24.41535
Between southern 
Italian and foreigner
For non-middle-aged 40.93722 22.51173
Between northern and 
southern Italian
For middle-aged 7.554241 4.542933
Between northern and 
southern Italian
For non-middle-aged 15.14675 8.44395
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religious minorities. If this link to the religious character is maintained, results 
found in this northern Italian area are in line with what Brüß (2008) discusses 
in his article on discrimination of Muslims in Berlin, London, and Madrid.
However, this point raises more than one question. First, it is unclear 
whether the less probable recourse to mortgages for foreigners (H2.2) is due 
to the use of alternative sources of financing (Islamic banking for Muslims), 
or to the anticipation of a probable refusal. This option may also be available, 
to some extent, to Italians too in the form of the “wait and pay cash” or the 
“friend exploitation” strategy (Secchi, 2011, p. 75) whereas alternative 
finance is probably more tied to culture and religion, as it is the case for 
Muslims. However, as argued elsewhere, “[t]hese are all secondary and very 
limited cases where people decide not to access a regular credit institution” 
(Secchi, 2011, p. 75). The case for alternative sources is extremely welcome 
in a pluralistic society, whereas the second factor—that of self-selection—
may be connected to perceived discrimination through the tendency to antici-
pate a refusal because the individual feels that it is most likely to happen. The 
first reason for self-selection due to anticipation of a probable refusal is due 
to the peculiarities of the Italian mortgage market.
In Italy a mortgage application is not as common as it may be in the Anglo-
American markets and is still perceived as an exceptional event. Some people 
simply do not even contemplate applying for a loan because they do not con-
sider themselves eligible for it, and this possibility is witnessed by the high 
rate of acceptance among applicants (89% in the sample). Moreover, apply-
ing for a mortgage in the Italian system involves the disclosure of a certain 
number of sensitive information to a bank clerk and to the manager of the 
subsidiary. This disclosure, especially if followed by a refusal, can be per-
ceived by the applicant as an intrusion into one’s private life. The second 
reason is less dependent on the country and more deeply linked to perceived 
discrimination. Several studies have shown that perceived discrimination is 
connected to anxiety, psychological distress (Kessler et al., 1999), and hyper-
tension (St. Jean & Feagin, 1998); rational individuals tend to avoid these 
forms of physical and psychological deficiency.
The identification of a low application rate with the phenomenon of self-
selection receives some support from the second set of hypotheses, those 
related to rejection. Findings suggest that foreigners are far more penalized in 
terms of rejection rates; age also contributes to expand the gap. The percent-
age of foreigners between 35 and 50 years of age that have their applications 
approved is 38% lower than that of Italians, and this number becomes 58% 
lower for young or old applicants. This information may explain the phenom-
enon that has been defined as self-selection: Individuals prefer not to get 
discriminated against by (a) choosing other sources of financing, and/or by 
(b) not applying for home mortgages.
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It has also been suggested that foreigners keep strong ties with their native 
countries and behave as if their lengths of stay in the host country is shorter 
than what it will turn out to be in reality, thus avoiding any act that can link 
them too deeply with the immigration country. However, recent studies 
(Brüß, 2008) suggest an opposite trend, that of the immigrants and especially 
of their children that consider the hosting country their “home.”
A recent study (Bonaccorsi di Patti & Felici, 2008) provides some evi-
dence that immigrants might have higher mortgage default probabilities than 
Italians. As that article has no proxy for income, family size, and job stability, 
it is probable that this difference is due to the fact that immigrants, in general, 
are prone to accept more precarious jobs and thus have lower income than 
Italians. This difference in mortgage defaults may serve as an explanation for 
these results. However, job instability is hardly an explanation of higher 
default and rejection rates in the selected sample as it is composed of public 
sector employees; also, in the measures there is a proxy for NTJ. The analysis 
also features several measures of creditworthiness that were absent in the 
study mentioned above. It may therefore be the case that mortgage rejection 
rates observed in the study are partly due to statistical discrimination, namely, 
to the identification of immigrants as a high default class, irrespective of their 
actual creditworthiness.
Last, it may be that the observed discrimination is in reality due to an 
unequal sampling probability for Italians and foreigners. This problem may be 
a consequence of a sampling frame bias: the fact that the sampling frame is not 
representative of the population. Or it may be caused by sampling error, that 
is, fluctuations in the number of individuals belonging to a particular category; 
as often happens in retrospective studies, it may be that small categories, such 
as immigrants, are under- or over-sampled. In both situations, it is of interest 
to re-estimate the model for mortgage acceptance, namely Y i2, , varying the 
sampling probability of immigrants. The model was rewritten in an equivalent 
form in which the ABR regressor appears explicitly. Then, the sampling prob-
ability was computed so that it would yield a test for the nullity of the ABR 
coefficient whose p value is exactly 5%, and the test is marginally significant 
at 95%. This significance holds if immigrants were sampled at least 2.503129 
times more than non-immigrants. As immigrants are 6.8% of the total sample, 
this line of reasoning would lead to a very low percentage of immigrants in the 
population (below 2.85%) that is not compatible with common sense.
Gender
The Italian social model is known for being based on males, showing a tradi-
tion of overt and accepted discrimination toward women. The fact that 
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findings show no evidence of this aspect may be related to many different 
factors (Dinev et al., 2006, p. 391ff.).
First, Italian social habits are under continuous change such that women 
are no longer marginal in the economic and social lives. Second, the role of 
women in the economy is changing too, as their employment rate has grown 
higher and higher (European Commission, 2008).
However, as national statistics show, salaries are, in most of the cases, 
much lower for women than for men, especially when related to the European 
average (European Commission, 2008). This salary difference is also cap-
tured by the model when the positive correlation (.088) between the variable 
for NTJ and gender is considered. As women accept to work without tenure 
more often than men, there may be that discrimination is likely to be found 
more often in the job market than in the banking industry.
Broadly speaking, findings can be interpreted as a good signal. They sug-
gest that something is changing in this traditional Mediterranean country, and 
that women have credibility when they get access to credit.
Family, Income, and Age
The inability of variables related to family, income, and work to capture dif-
ferences in the probability of mortgage applications (and acceptance) is at 
first puzzling. It may be argued that several confounding factors—which 
were not accounted for in this study—could enter both choices and could bias 
the actual effect of these regressors. As an example, high-income customers 
may have a higher probability of mortgage acceptance (thus not experiencing 
self-selection) but may have a lower probability of applying. Moreover, cus-
tomers with no collaterals could be helped by someone else in their families 
who provide what the bank needs to fill in the applications.
It is very difficult to capture these effects in a retrospective study, avoiding 
arbitrariness in the recorded values of the variables. Nevertheless, the total 
absence of any effect of regressors related to family, income, and work is 
hardly affected by confounding factors; probably other factors are paramount 
in mortgage application and acceptance. The following short notes can help 
develop the analysis furthermore:
1. Hypotheses were built on the assumption that bigger size families are 
those where an “age effect” could be seen. When it is argued that 
families of three or more members asked for home mortgages in the 
past, it means that their age is higher than one and two-member fami-
lies. Table 3 shows very limited support to this hypothesis: Age and 
family size cannot be linked.
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2. There might be an effect related to nationality. Increases in Italian 
demographics are sustained by foreigners who move to improve their 
living conditions. These families (Istat, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 
2007a) show fertility rates and average size which are higher than the 
average Italian family. According to this information, Hypotheses 3.1 
and 3.2 could be affected by the fact that foreigners tend to have 
larger families. Correlation coefficients for FAM4 and FAM5 on one 
hand, and SITA, NITA, and ABR on the other hand present limited 
support to this argument. There seems to be no systematic relation 
between nationality and family size. In summary, family dimension is 
not related to diverse treatments for mortgage applications or rejec-
tion rates.
3. Income is an interesting variable to consider too. Table 3 confirms 
that higher incomes are slightly related to larger families and supports 
the rejection of family-related hypotheses. The data do not support 
any useful result when income and family size are considered together. 
No additional information is gained by splitting results to deal with 
income only.
Conclusion
This study was conducted in the winter of 2006-2007, before the financial 
crisis of September to October, 2008. Therefore, the situation today could be 
significantly different. There are three elements of the home mortgage market 
in Varese prior to the 2008 financial crisis that emerge from this study:
1. The market is fair as far as gender differences are considered. The 
number of women applying for mortgages is still lower than that of 
men. The study suggests that disparities in the job market (such as 
wage differentials) or in the social structure of the family may occur 
and explain the perceived difficulty for women and the occurrence of 
self-selection.
2. Members of large and small families are not discriminated against by 
bankers in the sense that there is no apparent disparity in their accep-
tance rates. The economic factor seems to be important here as larger 
families tend to have higher cumulative incomes, offsetting any bias 
against large families.
3. In line with the literature on home mortgage discrimination, this study 
does provide some evidence that ethnicity plays a role in discrimina-
tion and explains differentials in both application and rejection rates 
for non-Italians. Foreigners’ applications are more likely to be rejected 
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than the ones from Italians; the difference in probability varies 
between 38% and 58%, weighted by age. Findings also show that 
southern Italians experience discrimination when compared with 
northern Italians. While the relatively few cases of rejection strictly 
limit how strongly these findings can be asserted, the evidence of 
discrimination does not disappear in the analysis.
Limitations and Future Research
Some of the limitations of this research relate to structure and findings. The 
study provides evidence of ethnic discrimination; nevertheless, more data are 
needed to make results more robust. Also, an exploratory study such as this 
one should indicate the route for the analysis whereas future studies may 
assess the quality of these first preliminary results. If a generalized trend is to 
be found, more data and different methods should be used. For example, 
surveys conducted specifically on immigrants who work for different organi-
zations, as well as qualitative studies, are extremely useful when analyzing 
perceived or experienced discrimination.
The more traditional approach to discrimination tends to overlook the 
problem of non-captured consumer characteristics that manifest themselves 
in gender, ethnicity/nationality, and age, and so on. As Pager and Shepherd 
(2008) point out,
[t]he main liability of this approach is that it is difficult to effectively account 
for the multitude of factors relevant to unequal outcomes, leaving open the 
possibility that disparities attributed to discrimination may in fact be explained 
by some other unmeasured cause(s). (p. 184)
This problem is not only a risk for more traditional studies but remains an 
issue for the present study too. Although this research takes the perspective of 
de facto or perceived discrimination and matches it with proxies for credit-
worthiness, there are other relevant aspects that have not been addressed: 
motivation, satisfaction, lifestyle, culture, and personal values, and so on. 
This study shares this limit with other research on discrimination.
There are two more points that may serve as basis for future research. On 
one hand, even the limited evidence for discrimination found in home mort-
gages is an invitation to bank executives and managers to address this topic 
more consistently than they did in the past. If discrimination has really taken 
place in the market for mortgages, this discrimination cannot have taken 
place without the lack of action, or even the implicit agreement, of bankers 
that refrained from altering the status quo. The very procedures for mortgage 
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approval (discussed earlier) seem to be tailored to the average Italian cus-
tomer in a way that makes it harder for others to access. More recently, some 
companies have started to target the excluded segment of the market. While 
it is not appropriate to address policy issues in this article, there is some 
ground to strongly encourage the Italian banking industry to avoid discrimi-
nation. Why is avoidance in their interests? How can Italian banks limit dis-
criminatory behaviors? Should the EU regulate the market of home mortgages 
more heavily?
On the other hand, discrimination is an important topic for Italy. As men-
tioned at the beginning of the article, the rise of xenophobic and racist right-
wing parties is a motive of concern for European politics. Although it is not 
possible to draw a clear connection between the two phenomena from this 
study, the two issues of xenophobia and discrimination are certainly matters 
of concern in the ways they seem to emerge together (Pager & Shepherd, 
2008; Quillian, 2006). Due to the exploratory nature of this study, further 
investigations are needed. If the political vote is transferred on (or it is due to) 
unfair and illicit business practices, institutional bodies should take action 
before the phenomenon becomes widespread.
In summary, there are two major contributions of this study: (a) it pro-
vides an original econometric model (see Appendix) on a two-step proce-
dure to test for perceived discrimination and (b) the method of inquiry may 
constitute a starting point for future studies on perceived discrimination in 
conditions where other approaches to identify discrimination are not 
feasible.
Mathematical Appendix
Let Y1,i be a variable that takes the value 1 if the individual i applied for a 
mortgage and 0 otherwise. Let Y2,i be a variable that takes the value 1 if the 
request of the individual i was accepted and 0 otherwise: clearly, Y2,i is 
defined only when Y1,i = 1. Let xi be the set of regressors for individual i.
Therefore, the probability that individual i does not apply for a mortgage 
is the probability of observing Y1,i = 0, that is,
                                                    Pr Y1,i =( )0 xi .  (1)
The probability that individual i applies for a mortgage and receives a 
refusal is the probability of observing Y1,i = 1 and Y2,i = 0, that is,
         Pr Y Y x = Pr Y x Pr Y Y x1,i i i i i i i i= =( ) =( )× = =( )1 0 1 0 12 1, , ., ,1, 2,  (2)
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The probability that individual i applies for a mortgage and is accepted is 
the probability of observing Y1,i = 1 and Y2,i = 1, that is,
        Pr Y Pr Y Pr Y1,i 1,i 2,i= =( ) = =( )× = =( )1 1 1 1 12 1, , ., ,Y x x Y xi i i i i  (3)
Variables Y1,i and Y2,i are modeled through logit regression models, condi-
tionally on the vector of observed regressors xi. This modeling approach 
means that































                         






































The reader should remark that the regressors need not be the same in the 
two steps as some of the coefficients can be equal to 0.
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Notes
1. This description is a result of a short round of interviews with Italian bankers 
located in Varese and Como, Italy. Results were compared with official docu-
ments found in the Bank of Italy’s website although the level of detail presented 
in this subsection is not reached in any text of the authors’ knowledge.
2. These credit scoring measures were mainly introduced with the Basel II (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004) reform and have been constantly 
improved ever since; they were intended only for internal use at the time this 
study was conducted.
3. Another relevant variable may be the credit history of the individual, but as 
explained in the subsection “Description of the Home Mortgage Process,” credit 
scoring was unevenly used in Italy at the time the data were collected.
4. In September 2008, the bank CheBanca!, owned by Mediobanca, one of the larg-
est Italian investment bank, hit the news because it explicitly refused to provide 
products and services to immigrants, irrespective of their length of residency in 
Italy (Giannotti, 2008). In March 2012, the President and the CEO of Extrabanca, 
the first Italian bank explicitly designed for immigrants, were condemned for 
racial harassment of an employee.
5. Lombardy’s GDP per-capita in the years of the survey (2006-2007) was around 
€27,800 (Istat), given the EU-27 average of €23,500 and the euro-area average 
being €26,600 (Eurostat, 2008).
6. The authors have also tried to aggregate income, family size, and job variables in 
categories with a higher number of individuals, but this aggregation yielded no 
improvement with respect to the model specified in terms of the variables col-
lected in the survey.
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